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I. INTRODUCTION

As we move to a global environment, more consideration needs to be given

to issues of jurisdiction. In the criminal sphere, the question becomes: who
should hold perpetrators of criminal activity accountable for their conduct?
Should we look to the location where the crime is initiated,' the country that
is substantially affected by the criminality,2 the nationality of the perpetrator,3
the nationality of the victim,4 or all of these factors?' Would it be a better
course to consider international tribunals6 when more than one country has a
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. The author wishes to thank
Professor William S. Laufer and the faculty of the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
for their comments at a presentation as a part of the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for
Business Ethics Research. The author also wishes to thank Trishanda Hinton for her research
assistance.
'In international law, there are five accepted bases of jurisdiction. Harvard Research in
International Law, Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L.
437, 445 (Supp. 1935). This is the essence of one of these international bases of jurisdiction
referred to as territorial jurisdiction. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
' This is an international base of jurisdiction referred to as "objective territorial"
jurisdiction. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
This is an international base ofjurisdiction referred to as nationalityjurisdiction. See infra
notes 50, 52 and accompanying text.
4This is an international base ofjurisdiction referred to as the passive personality principle
ofjurisdiction. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
' Courts sometimes refer to more than onejurisdictional base when using international bases
ofjurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d 601,606-08 (E.D.LA. 1998)
(using the objective territorial principle and the passive personality principle).
' Although international tribunals have been created to prosecute war crimes, and a
proposed International Criminal Court is presently being considered by countries throughout the
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connection to the activity? In determining the appropriate jurisdiction in a
global society a multitude of different factors need to be examined. Two
variables are particularly important in extraterritorial jurisdiction questions.
These are: (1) who is examining the issue of extraterritoriality, and (2) for
what conduct.
This Article focuses on business crimes that occur outside this country. It
limits the context for consideration of extraterritorial jurisdiction to business
crimes.7 It also limits the perspective for examining the appropriate jurisdiction in that it considers conduct solely from the standpoint of whether the
United States should be permitted to prosecute the alleged extraterritorial
business crime. This is not a comparative piece, and as such it does not focus
on how other countries might approach similar questions. It is important,
however, to recognize that with the globalization of society, a national
perspective often carries with it international implications.
This Article begins by defining the scope of the term "business crimes."
In examining the extraterritorial reach of United States prosecutions, the focus
is on congressional wording, executive action, judicial interpretation, and
international bases of jurisdiction!s It then turns to the conduct involved and
the impact it can have on whether an extraterritorial prosecution will be
permitted." It is argued here that in the limited context of business crimes,
extraterritorial prosecutions should be limited to instances when the federal
government is the victim of the crime and the conduct requires prosecution as
protection of a governmental interest. Conduct merely having a substantial
effect on individuals within the country should not be a sufficient basis for a
United States prosecution of a business crime. A defensive approach to
prosecuting extraterritorial criminal acts, as opposed to proceeding in a
proactive or aggressive manner, is advocated here.
H. WHAT IS A BUSINESS

CRIME?

In order to consider the extraterritorial prosecution of business crimes, it is
important to first set the parameters of the conduct. The rationale and
world, these tribunals have never considered business crimes, the crimes that are the subject of
this Article. See generally EDWARD M. WISE & ELLEN S. PODGOR, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 516-708 (2000) (discussing international tribunals).
'For a discussion of what is included within the term "business crimes," see infra notes 1019 and accompanying text.
sSee infra notes 20-68 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 82-113 and accompanying text.
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importance of distinguishing business crimes from other types of criminal acts
is discussed later."0
Business crimes are not a distinct category of crime found in the Bureau of
Justice Statistics." But then again, white collar crime, a more accepted term
with strong sociological roots,' is also not a designated category in the
statistical databases used by the government." The term "business crimes,"
as used here, is meant to encompass criminal activity where the perpetrator of
the activity is directly related to the operation of a legitimate business."' It is
also limited to non-violent criminal acts.
Business crimes are distinguished from white collar crime in that white
collar activity encompasses a broader category of criminality."5 For example,
an individual who commits perjury or makes a false statement may be engaged
in white collar criminal activity. This individual, however, would not
necessarily be engaged in a business crime if the activity had no connection to
a particular business entity.
Business crimes are therefore a subset, albeit a large subset, of what may
be encompassed within white collar crime. Business crimes, however, are a
larger subset than what might be included in corporate criminal activity. In
contrast to corporate criminal activity, business crimes as used in this Article,
includes partnerships and other legitimate associations that operate without a

,0 See infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
"See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Crime Characteristics,at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjsl
cvictc.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
", The term white collar crime originates from a speech given by Edwin Sutherland to the
American Sociological Society in 1939. Edwin H. Sutherland, Thirty-fourth Annual Presidential
Address to the American Sociological Society (Dec. 27, 1939), in Edwin H. Sutherland, WhiteCollar Criminality,5 AM. Soc. REV. 1 (1940).
'3 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 11.
14 Business cimes, as the term is used in this Article, focuses on the perpetrator as
opposed
to the victim of the criminal conduct. Although the perpetrator of the crime is related to a
business entity, there is no limit to the victims of business crimes. Business crimes can be
against other entities, individuals, or against the government.
"s Although a variety ofdefinitions have been attributed to white collar crime, all encompass
more than just the activities of legitimate businesses. See EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 7 (1983) (defining white collar crime as "a crime
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation");
David T. Johnson & Richard A. Leo, Book Note, The Yale White-Collar Crime Project:A
Review and Critique,18 LAw& Soc. INQUIRY 63,64-72 (1993) (discussing different definitions
of white collar crime); JEROLD H. ISRAELET AL, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE I11 (1996) (discussing the sociological origins of white collar crime and the legal definitions
offered today).
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legal veil. It encompasses the legitimate organizations found in the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, without including those that might
be wholly illegitimate. 6 An example of a wholly illegitimate organization is
an illegal gambling entity. 7
Looking at what is not a business crime should assist in delineating what
the category of business crimes does include. When the essence of the
organization is to participate in illegal conduct, with no relation to legitimate
activities, then it is not a business for the purposes of this Article. These
activities have no redeeming qualities and require separate consideration in
determining who will have authority to prosecute the extraterritorial criminal
conduct. Therefore, crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering related
to drug activity," and terrorist activity are not business crimes as defined here.
Although it is conceded that in some cases, the line between legitimate
business activity and wholly illegitimate activities maybe open to question, the
ends of the spectrum present clear distinctions. A corporation that engages in
overseas bribery is not functionally comparable to Al Qaeda. The legitimacy
of the entity of a corporation that serves a public demand but also engages in
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations is functionally opposite Al Qaeda's
mission of engaging in activities such as "blasting and destroying the
embassies and attacking vital economic centers" and "assassinating enemy
personnel as well as foreign tourists."19 Obviously, the non-violence versus
violence dichotomy distinguishes a legitimate organization from an illegitimate
organization such as Al Qaeda. But even absent a non-violent purpose, an
illegitimate organization still has no legitimate business function.
" The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual defines an "organization" as a "person other
than an individual." An organization "includes corporations, partnerships, associations, jointstock companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated organizations, governments and
political subdivisions thereof, and non-profit organizations." UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1. (2000).
," Internet gambling that operates in the United States is a recent concern of prosecutors.
See Bruce Zagaris, Two PersonsPlead Guilty in InternationalInternet Sports Wagering, 18
INT'LENFORCEMENTL. REP. 55 (2002) (describing the prosecution oftwo individuals associated

with Gold Medal Sports, "an online sports book that operates out of Curacao, Netherlands
Antilles").
I Money laundering is no longer a crime limited to drug activity, but has been added in

cases involving white collar offenses. See Teresa Adams, Note, Tacking on Money Laundering
Chargesto White CollarCrimes: What Did CongressIntend, and What are the CourtsDoing?,
17 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 531, 558-66 (2000) (discussing the use of money laundering charges in
white collar crime cases).
"9Al Qaeda Training Manual, 13 (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://www.usdoj.
gov/ag/manualpartl-l.pdf) (last modified Oct. 8, 2002) (listing the missions of Al Qaeda).
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III. FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

Two variables that influence how extraterritorial jurisdiction questions are
resolved are (1) the country examining the issue and (2) the conduct that is
being examined. Many issues accompany each of these factors. The following
looks first at extraterritorial jurisdiction from a United States perspective and
then examines how the conduct that is involved can effect the outcome of
extraterritorial jurisdiction questions. Both variables are initially viewed in the
abstract without reflection of how these issues would be resolved in the
context of business crimes. Although there is discussion in this section of why
it is necessary to distinguish different types of conduct such as business
crimes, the contextual discussion of how extraterritoriality is applied
specifically to business crimes is covered in Part V.
A. ExtraterritorialJurisdictionfrom a US. Perspective
The focus here is on the first variable in that answers to jurisdiction
questions can vary depending upon the country handling the matter. Although
there are international norms that provide a semblance of order to questions of
jurisdiction," countries do not always respond to extraterritorial jurisdiction
questions with the same answers. This Article provides a national perspective
on how the United States resolves the boundaries of extraterritoriality.
In the United States, there are four dimensions to questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The three branches of government and the functions of these
branches comprise three of these dimensions. Thus, the legislative language
or intent in drafting the statute, the executive decision to prosecute activity,
and the judicial interpretation of whether the statute should have an extraterritorial application form basic considerations in whether there is extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Another dimension, international law, also can influence all three
of the government branches in their decisions of whether to permit an
extraterritorial application. The judiciary often uses international law in
resolving extraterritorial issues.

20 See generally WISE & PODGOR, supra note 6, at 28-71 (discussing general principles
related to extraterritorial jurisdiction).
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1. Executive
The initial decision of whether to proceed with an extraterritorial prosecution is within the province of the executive branch. Prosecutors have the
discretion to decide who they will prosecute and for what crimes.2 Although
bound by legislative constraints, and later judicial review, prosecutors have
enormous discretion in making these decisions.' The ethical mandates merely
provide that "[tjhe prosecutor in a criminal case shall: refrain from prosecuting
a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause."23
American Bar Association standards provide factors for consideration by a
prosecutor in exercising his or her discretion, but these only offer guiding
principles, and with respect to conduct outside the prosecutor's jurisdiction,
merely state that a "prosecutor may properly consider" the "availability and
likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction."' As such, there is no real
outside guidance offered to prosecutors on the propriety of bringing prosecutions for extraterritorial crimes.
Department of Justice guidelines, however, do provide instructions to
United States Attorneys who are considering a prosecution of conduct that
occurs outside the United States. 2' For example, the guidelines provide that
authorization is required to prosecute a case under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.26 Also, some cases warrant consultation with the Criminal
Division Office prior to prosecution.27 These guidelines, however, are not
legally enforceable. 28
2 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion.").
I See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,607 (1985) (prosecutors have broad discretion
in their decisions to prosecute).
3 MODEL

RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2002).

Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice Standard 3.9(b)-(c) (1974).
" The United States Attorney Manual offers guidelines that operate to assist United States
Attorneys in their decisions. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL §
9-47.00 (1997).
Ild.at § 9-47.00 ("No investigation or prosecution of cases involving alleged violations of
Section 103 and 104, and related violations of Section 102, of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) of 1977. .. shall be instituted without the express authorization of the Criminal
Division.").
2 Prior approvals or consultation with the Office of International Affairs is required in some
cases. See id. at § 9-2.400 (2000).
1 The U.S. Attorney's Manual specifically provides that it is an "internal" document and that
2
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A prosecutor's decision to proceed against individuals for extraterritorial
crimes is rarely found to be improper by the courts. One of the few instances
where a U.S. Court reversed a conviction for an alleged crime committed
outside the United States is found in the case of United States v. Boots." In
this case, the First Circuit reversed a wire fraud conviction finding that the
prosecution had as "its sole object the violation of Canadian revenue laws."3
The court found the scheme "beyond the parameters of the frauds cognizable
under section 1343," the wire fraud statute. 3 ' Although the court's decision
rested on the boundaries of the term "fraud," the extraterritorial aspect did not
go unnoticed. The court expressed concern with interference in "the
legislative and executive branches' exercise of their foreign policymaking
powers. '"3' A Second Circuit case with a similar factual setting, however,
refused to follow the position taken in Boots.3 3 The Second Circuit, in Trapilo,
found that, "[t]he simple fact that the scheme to defraud involves a foreign
sovereign's revenue laws does not draw our inquiry into forbidden waters
reserved exclusively
to the legislative and the executive branches of our
'
goverMnment.v 34
There are few limits on a prosecutor's discretion. Prosecutions premised
on "impermissible classification[s]" such as race will not be tolerated. 3 Even
then, the defense has the burden to show that the prosecutor proceeded with a
"discriminatory purpose."'M Discretionary decisions, such as the decision to
prosecute an extraterritorial crime, are left to the executive branch with little,

"[i]t isnot intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal." Id. at § I-1.100.
See also United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 742 (1979) (providing that courts will not

enforce failures to comply with the internal guidelines for the Department of Justice when an
individual's constitutional rights are not violated).
United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996).

10 Id. at 587.
" Id. at 586.

32 Id. at 587-88.
The First Circuit also noted that 18 U.S.C. § 546 (1994) prohibited
smuggling goods into foreign countries only if the other country has a reciprocal law. Id. The

court stated, "[p]rosecutors, who operate within the executive branch, might of course be
expected not to pursue wire fraud prosecutions based on smuggling schemes aimed at blatantly
hostile countries, but whether conduct is criminal cannot be a determination left solely to
prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 588.
" See United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 549 (2d Cir. 1997) (permitting a wire fraud
prosecution premised upon a scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue).
Id. at 553.
WAYNE LAFAVE & JEROLD ISRAEL, CRM~INAL PROcEURE
36 See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,292 (1987).

§ 1.8(c) (2d ed. 1999).
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if any, outside monitoring. This discretion is particularly noteworthy because
Congress seldom places limits within a statute on extraterritorial prosecutions.
2. Legislative
When Congress directly focuses a statute on extraterritorial conduct, the
jurisdiction to prosecute activities outside the United States is clear.37 For
example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act permits the prosecution of
individuals and businesses that engage in bribery, despite the fact that the
conduct occurs extraterritorially.3 The Act was specifically designed to stop
bribery by United States businesses that occurs outside this country. 9 There
is no question that prosecutors have extraterritorial jurisdiction to proceed
when there is a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Export
Administration Act,4 or the Arms Export Control Act,4" because Congress
enacted these statutes to stop activities occurring outside this country.
Although the focus of a statute may be to curtail criminal activity occurring
outside the United States' borders, Congress may place limits on the individuals subject to prosecution under the Act. For example, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act specifically excludes prosecution against foreign officials.42

' Ellen S. Podgor, Essay, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar
Crime, 34 AM. CRIUM. L. REV. 325, 329 (1997) (noting several instances in which Congress
specifically focused a statute on conduct outside the United States).
38 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3 (2000).
"The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, initially passed in 1977 and amended in 1988, had the
distinct purpose of stopping the bribing of foreign government officials. See generallyDONALD
R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FoREiGN CoiuPr PRACncEs ACT (2d ed. 1999).
o See 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420 (1994) (requiring licenses for certain goods that are
shipped).
41 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2799-2 (2000) (restricting certain military items).

I' When the Act was revised in 1998, House Report 105-802 discussed the purpose for the
initial legislation, stating:
Investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the mid1970s revealed that over 400 U.S. companies admitted making questionable
or illegal payments in excess of $300 million to foreign government officials,
politicians, and political parties. Many public companies maintained cash
"slush funds" from which illegal campaign contributions were being made in
the United States and illegal bribes were being paid to foreign officials.
Scandals involving payments by U.S. companies to public officials in Japan,
Italy, and Mexico led to political repercussions within those countries and
damaged the reputation of American companies throughout the world.
H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 9 (1998).
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Courts may provide interpretation that can also limit these prosecutions, as in
not permitting a prosecutor to use conspiracy as a charge to bypass the
statute's restriction on indicting foreign officials.43
In some cases, Congress takes a generic statute and provides, within the
statute, an extraterritorial provision. For example, two money laundering
statutes" and a key perjury statute"5 have specific provisions that authorize
prosecutors to proceed in certain situations with the action, even if the conduct
occurs extraterritorially.
In those instances when Congress has spoken by either directly focusing a
statute on extraterritorial conduct or including a provision within the statute
that authorizes extraterritoriality, the intent of Congress is clear, and the
extraterritorial prosecution is permitted. Obviously, if Congress were to
reexamine existing statutes and determine the circumstances when extraterritoriality should or should not be permitted, then the ambiguity that causes
concern here would be less problematic." Such a reevaluation, however,
needs to consider the issues addressed in parts IV, V, and VI of this Article.
3. InternationalNorms
Reference can also be made to international law to resolve issues concerning the propriety of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The five generally accepted

' In UnitedStates v. Castle,925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit refused to permit

prosecutors to proceed against two Canadian officials who had been charged with conspiracy
under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000), for their alleged conspiring to
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The court did not allow prosecutors to circumvent the
language of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by using a charge of conspiracy. The statute did
not include foreign officials, and the court found that the congressional intent was to preclude
this application. 925 F.2d at 832-36.
"Both 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 (2000), two money laundering statutes, include
extraterritorial provisions. These provisions, however, provide clear guidance as to when they
apply. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f) (2000) provides:
There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by this
section if(1) the conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a non-United
States citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the United States; and
(2) the transaction or series of related transactions involves funds or monetary
instruments of a value exceeding $10,000.
41 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000) (providing that "[tlhis section is applicable whether the statement
or subscription is made within or without the United States").
" See Podgor, supra note 37, at 344-46.
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bases of international jurisdiction are territoriality, nationality, passive
personality, protective principle, and universality."7
Territorial jurisdiction refers to acts that occur within the territory. Such
acts do not raise the jurisdictional questions considered in this article since the
focus here is on extraterritorial conduct. In recent years, however, territoriality
has been subdivided to include both territoriality and "objective territoriality."
It is this latter distinction that raises the concerns addressed here. "Objective
territoriality" includes "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to
produce and producing detrimental effects within it."" Activities, such as drug
trafficking, that occur outside the United States are often prosecuted under this
49
"objective territorial" principle, as the conduct can "affect" the United States.
Another basis of jurisdiction, nationality, looks at the nationality of the
perpetrator of the crime.-" In contrast, passive personality focuses on the
nationality of the victim.51 Both the nationality and passive personality
principles have been used on occasion to prosecute conduct outside the United
States." United States prosecutors have also used the protective principle as

47 See Dickinson, supra note 1.
4" Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (holding that when a person completes a
material act toward committing a crime within a state, yet completes the crime outside of that
state, he or she becomes a fugitive of justice for extradition purposes). Justice Holmes, the
author of the Strassheim decision, had written two years prior that "ft]he general and almost
universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done." Am Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347, 356 (1909). See also J. Thomas Coffin, The Extraterritorial Application ofthe Economic

Espionage Act of1996, 23 HAsTiNGS INT'L& CoMP. L. REv. 527, 539-40 (2000) (discussing the
effects test and different opinions issued by Justice Holmes on this issue).
" See Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1984) (using the

objective territorial principle and also finding the extraterritorial application justified under the
protective principle).
-o See generally Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based

Criminal Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 41 (1992) (discussing nationality as a basis for
jurisdiction in criminal cases).
" See generally Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEx. INT'LL.J.
I (1993) (discussing the passive personality principle as a basis for jurisdiction in the United

States).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, I F. Supp. 2d 601,606-08 (E.D. La. 1998) (using the
passive personality principle); United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1986)
(using a nationality principle where a United States citizen was accused of making a false
statement on a customs form).
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a basis for an extraterritorial prosecution. 3 This principle is premised upon
national security or a threat to the United States by the perpetrator's conduct.'
Universality jurisdiction, often seen as being premised on crimes against
humanity, lends itself well to finding jurisdiction for a prosecution by
international tribunals." Recently, the International Court of Justice ruled that
Belgium could not try the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic
Republic of Congo for alleged war crimes.' The International Court of Justice
found that immunity protected former and present world leaders from
prosecution by a country other than their ownY Although universality was not
the focus of this decision, Belgium had initiated the action and used universal
jurisdiction based upon the prosecution of conduct alleged to be in violation
of human rights."'
Countries can also authorize jurisdiction through international agreements.
Treaties that allow for extradition and prosecution in the United States may
assist in providing an easier process for an extraterritorial application. 9 In
cases where countries enter into treaties to resolve possible extraterritorial
issues, the parties can agree to a mutually beneficial resolution of a disputed
question.
4. Judiciary
When Congress clearly provides forjurisdiction by focusing the statute on
acts outside this country or by an extraterritorial provision within the statute,
there is no question that the United States has a basis for proceeding with the
prosecution. When Congress does not mention extraterritoriality in the statute,
as is the case in the majority of criminal statutes, courts are left to resolve the
issue of whether the extraterritorial application should be allowed. Courts

s- See, e.g., United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808, 811-12 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding the
protective principle applicable where there is a falsification of documents).

" See generally lAIN CAMERON, THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION (1994).
" See generally Kenneth C. Randall, UniversalJurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66
TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988) (discussing the realm of universal jurisdiction).

I See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of I1 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121, at 21-22 (Feb. 14), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe-ijudgment_20020214.PDF.
See id.

"See id. at 17.
59 See WISE & PODGOR, supra note

6, at 2-4.
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approach this issue by trying to discern the intent of Congress,' looking to
whether jurisdiction is authorized under the international bases of
jurisdiction, 6 ' or by using an approach that combines an examination of
congressional intent and international law.6'
Courts have also referenced the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law section 402, which provides principles for jurisdiction to prescribe,63 and
also section 403, which speaks to limits on the jurisdiction to prescribe." It is
in the latter provision that one finds factors for determining whether the

60

See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 246 F.3d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding Congress

intended the wire fraud statute to be applied extraterritorially); United States v. Plummer, 221
F.3d 1298, 13034 (1 th Cir. 2000) (finding Congress intended that the crime of attempted
smuggling under 18 U.S.C. § 545 should be applied extraterritorially); United States v. Larsen,
952 F.2d 1099, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing whether Congress intended the crime of
knowing and intentional possession with intent to distribute marijuana to apply
extraterritorially); United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1128-29 (5th Cir. 1980) (looking
at whether Congress intended drug conspiracy statutes to apply extraterritorially).
61 See, e.g., United States v. Best, 172 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (D.V.l. 2001) (discussing
international bases ofjurisdiction that courts look to in deciding the extraterritorial application
of a statute); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding
the protective and territorial principles applied).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez-Mercado, 697 F. Supp. 292, 294 (S.D. Tex. 1988)

(looking first at congressional intent and then at international bases ofjurisdiction).
0 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN REILATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
(1987) provides:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substan-

tial effect within its territory;,
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well
as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is
directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other

state interests.
"

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWOFTHE UNITED STATES

(1987) states:
(1) Even when one of the bases forjurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or
activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable.

§ 403(1)
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extraterritorial application would be unreasonable.65 Concerns of comity,'
that is respect for the laws of other countries, can factor into whether a Court
will allow an extraterritorial application. 7
Although guidance for resolving these issues is provided to courts, the
reality is that few prosecutions of extraterritorial criminal conduct will be
turned aside as falling outside the boundaries of international law. The bases

615
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWOFTHE UNITED STATES

§ 403(2)

(1987) states:
(2) Whether exercise ofjurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable
is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate
such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation
is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHEFOREIGNRELATIONS LAWOFTHE UNITED STATES § 403(3)
(1987) provides:
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states
are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the
other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant
factors, including those set out in Subsection (2); a state should defer to the
other state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
67 It should be noted that comity is described here in its most basic sense. In reality, there
are a myriad of different definitions attributed to the concept of comity. See generally Joel R.
Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw,32 HARV. INT'LL.J. 1 (1991) (discussing different definitions
and approaches to comity from its classical doctrine to its present applications); Michael D.
Ramsey, Escaping "InternationalComity", 83 IoWA L. REv. 893 (1998) (discussing the need
to use more precise language than the term "international comity").
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of jurisdiction leave ample room for courts to find support for permitting the
prosecution to proceed with cases premised on extraterritorial acts."
0

B. The Importanceof Factoringin Conduct in Analyzing the Extraterritorial
Jurisdictionof Business Crimes
In situations where Congress has considered the extraterritorial application
of the statute and also spoken clearly by designating whether the statute could
be applied to conduct outside the United States, courts need not reflect on
whether the conduct merits an extraterritorial application. The issue has been
resolved and judicial interpretation that might differ from the language of the
statute would be improper. In most cases, however, courts must discern the
intent of Congress in order to determine whether international rules permit an
extraterritorial application. It is in these instances that a key ingredient to the
discussion needs to be an examination of the particular criminal conduct in
question.
We might end the judicial inquiry after making a determination as to
whether Congress intended an extraterritorial application. After all, should we
consider beyond what Congress says or implies in a statute? Is there any basis
for distinguishing different types of conduct when examining questions of
extraterritoriality?"9 Prior to reflecting on the specific contextual setting of
whether business crimes should be allowed an extraterritorial application, the
basis for distinguishing this type of activity merits discussion.
1. The Need for a Multidimensional Approach to Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction
A unified statutory approach to extraterritoriality for all federal crimes was
suggested in a proposal of the National Commission on Reform of the Federal

For example, courts have held that the term "foreign commerce" implies that foreign
commerce can be protected when the acts in furtherance of it are performed either inside or
outside the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 1999 WL 782749, 8-9 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (finding sufficient subject matter jurisdiction to deny a motion to dismiss); United States
v. Braverman, 376 F.2d 249,251 (2d Cir. 1967) (discussing ability to protect foreign commerce
both inside and outside the United States).
" In United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922), the Supreme Court, in looking
at the extraterritoriality of crimes, noted that "[t]he necessary locus, when not specifically
defined, depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by the description and nature ofthe
crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the power and jurisdiction of a government to
punish crime under the law of nations" (emphasis added).
6
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Criminal Laws.7" This proposal, however, was not accepted.7 The proposed
statute did not apply extraterritoriality across the board to all federal crimes,
but instead designated specific types of conduct that could form the basis of
an extraterritorial prosecution.' The proposal also noted that treaties could
provide a basis for extraterritorial application."
A basic fault of an approach that considers extraterritoriality abstractly,
without taking into account the specific conduct of the case, is that it places
courts in a position of discerning congressional intent with no real basis for
truly ascertaining what, if anything, Congress really intended in the statute.
The policy considerations that form the congressional intent need to encompass the conduct and the purpose for which this particular conduct was
selected for punishment. It is for this reason that a multidimensional approach,
an approach that allows for the possibility of adjusting extraterritoriality for
different types of criminal conduct, is warranted.
The type of conduct involved should factor into whether the extraterritorial
application should be allowed. For example, war crimes present different
considerations than business crimes and should not be handled in an equivalent
manner. The United States could have prosecuted under international
principles, most clearly the universality principle, the individuals in the
Nuremberg Trial, but the use of an international military tribunal that included
the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as the provisional Government of the
French Republic, was clearly a more systematic and unified way to handle the
prosecution of these crimes.7 ' Thus, although extraterritorial jurisdiction
might be allowed under international or national norms, Congress may not
70 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, FINAL REPORT OF

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws § 208 (1971)

(suggesting that a general statute regarding extraterritoriality be included in a proposal to reform
federal criminal law).
" See generally Kenneth R. Feinberg, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction and the Proposed
Federal Criminal Code, 72 J.CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 385 (1981) (discussing the proposed
federal criminal code's provision of extraterritoriality).
' The proposed federal statute had various forms of conduct that would receive extraterritorialjurisdiction. Examples of conduct that would have extraterritorial jurisdiction, even though
it was not expressly stated in the substantive portion of the statute, included "the offense of
treason" and an offense "involving entry of persons or property into the United States."
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CIUMENAL LAWS § 208 (1971).
I The proposal provided extraterritorial jurisdiction where "such jurisdiction is provided by
treaty." Id.
74See ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATONAL LAW 85-95 (2d
impression rev. 1962).
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have intended to apply extraterritoriality to certain acts or conduct when the
specific conduct is examined by a court.
Likewise, terrorism may require an international response, while other
crimes may be better handled through a multinational or national response.
New developing areas that might have no geographic boundaries present
complex considerations in determining extraterritoriality. For example,
computer crimes can raise a host of issues depending upon how the computer
is used in relation to the criminal activity.7" If it is used as the medium to
commit the crime, and the crime is a fraud, one resolution might be better
served than when the computer is used as the "target"76 of the crime, and the
crime is to infiltrate a government defense system.
2. DistinguishingBusiness Crimes
The reason for the emphasis on business crimes is because it is argued that
this type of criminality has unique characteristics that warrant a different
application from some other crimes with respect to whether an extraterritorial
prosecution should be permitted. Three pertinent differences that can arise in
comparing business crime with typical forms of domestic criminality are the
fact that business crimes can be related to a legitimate entity, businesses today
often operation in a global economy, and business crimes can have both a civil
and criminal dimension to the conduct.
Despite the illegality in which business entities may be engaged, it can be
important to preserve the legitimate business functions and to protect innocent
employees, stockholders, and the public. One does not often find this
consideration in non-business related crimes. Although third parties might
suffer as a result of an individual's criminal conduct, the ramifications to
innocent parties who wish to continue to engage in business is also an
important consideration, especially when a legitimate organization has a
"rogue" individual or individuals engaging in the criminal activity. For

I See generally Ellen S. Podgor, International Computer Fraud:A Paradigm for Limiting
National Jurisdiction, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 267 (2002) (discussing the need to distinguish
computer fraud acts from other types of computer crimes in determining the appropriate
approach for national jurisdiction).
76 See Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931,934 (1996)
(discussing how computers can be the "target of the offense," "tool of the offense," or "incidental
to the offense"); see also Ellen S. Podgor, Computer Crime, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME &
JUSTICE 221, 221-28 (Joshua Dressier ed., 2d ed. 2002); Joe D. Whitley & William H. Jordan,
Computer Crime, ABA WHITE CO.LARCRIME INST. § 1.0 1[1], at 1.01[I] (2003) (describing the
different ways that computers can be used to commit crimes).
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example, when legitimate businesses are taken over by the government
pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act,"
the government may assume control of the business to maintain its legitimate
structure and eliminate the improprieties occurring within the legitimate
business environment.'
Globalization can also play a factor in approaching this particular type of
crime differently from some other classes of criminality. Business crimes,
especially those related to international business, can include an international
dimension to the conduct. One does not find this international feature when
looking at many domestic crimes. For example, there is seldom an international aspect to a state homicide, rape, burglary or theft charge. Although each
of these crimes can occur outside United States territory and be prosecuted by
the United States, it is seldom a function of the fact that a legitimate entity is
operating in a global society.
In contrast to individual crimes that occur outside a business setting,
business crimes can sometimes be remedied and curtailed through existing
civil remedies." Hence, prosecution may not be the sole consideration in
deciding how best to deter, rehabilitate or provide retribution for the conduct. °
Collateral consequences, such as debarment or the loss of a license, need to be
factored into the prosecutor's decision of whether criminal action should be
taken."1
Business crimes, therefore, may have distinct attributes that distinguish
them from more traditional domestic crimes, especially those involving
violence. The three factors discussed here, that business crimes are encircled
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
is See United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, 871 F.2d 401,
405-09 (3d Cir. 1989) (government takeover of union); see also Raymond P. Green, The
Application ofRICO to Labor-Management and Employment Disputes, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
309 (1995). See generally United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 941 F.2d
1292 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing issues resulting from government control of a local union).
' Both the government and individuals have the option of bringing civil actions. Although
this can be true for both business and non-business crimes, the victims of business crimes may
have more avenues for pursuing remedies. For example, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) gives third parties the option of bringing a civil action for wrongs
committed against them. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964. This statute has also been used for extraterritorial crimes. See Concern Sojuzneshtrans v. Buyanovski, 80 F. Supp. 2d 273, 277-78 (D.N.J.
1999) (finding jurisdiction for alleged extraterritorial activities in a RICO case when the action
was brought by a Russian corporation against a New Jersey corporation and individuals
associated with the corporation for alleged extraterritorial activities).
"

"oFor example, many business improprieties may be pursued by the government through

civil action, such as a civil RICO action. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
" See ISRAELET AL, supra note 15, at 803-17.
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by a legitimate structure, that the entity may be routinely operating globally,
and that civil remedies may factor into whether a criminal prosecution will be
necessary, provide the basis for saying that these types of crimes need to be
examined separately when considering issues of extraterritoriality. Clearly,
there will be some crimes that may manifest some or all of these factors. But
the very fact that so many different types of criminal conduct do not exhibit
these characteristics supports treatment of extraterritoriality in a multidimensional manner. The necessity of separating the variations in types of
conduct, especially business crimes, is evidenced below.
IV.CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS-EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF BUSINESS CRIMES

Looking generally at the conduct involved requires that one first look at
how extraterritoriality is approached in criminal actions. The specific
contextual setting of business crimes is then examined. It becomes apparent
here that the attributes of business crimes do not correlate well with existing
international norms applicable to extraterritoriality. Therefore, international
norms should be modernized to reflect how businesses currently operate.
A. CriminalLaw
Criminal law traditionally used a standard for determining whether
extraterritoriality is appropriate that differed from the approach used in civil
law. Where minimum contacts may allow for an extraterritorial application in
a civil action,82 extraterritorial actions in the criminal area historically required
a more restrained approach. Historically, territorial jurisdiction was a
necessary ingredient for a criminal prosecution. This standard was relaxed,
however, with the Supreme Court decision in UnitedStates v. Bowman. 3
Bowman involved an alleged "conspiracy . . . to defraud the Fleet
Corporation, in which the United States was a stockholder."" Thejurisdiction
for the first count was "on the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any
particular State, and out of the jurisdiction of any district of the United States,
but within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States."' s
Jurisdiction for the second count was premised "on the high seas and at the
" See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315-20 (1945) (requiring sufficient
contacts beyond casual presence before establishing a corporation's personal jurisdiction);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723-34 (1877).
'3 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
8 Id. at 96.
sId.

2002]

DEFENSIVE TERRITORIALITY

port of Rio Janeiro, as well as in the city."" Count three's jurisdiction was
described as in the city of Rio Janeiro, the fourth count was in the harbor of
Rio Janeiro, the fifth count in the city, and the sixth count at both the port and
in the city.87 The district court found no jurisdiction in count one and
"sustained the demurrer" as to the other counts." This lower'court found no
statement in the statute permitting jurisdiction for this offense when
"committed on the high seas or in a foreign country."89 This position was in
keeping with the traditional view that absent a clear congressional statement,
courts would not permit extraterritorial jurisdiction in criminal cases."° The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that "[t]he necessary locus, when not
specially defined, depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by the
description and nature of the crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the
power and jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law of
nations."9'
Bowman designates two classes of crimes in its analysis. First are those
crimes "against private individuals or their property."92 Absent a clear
congressional statement, these require prosecution within the territorial
jurisdiction of the act.93 The second category includes "criminal statutes which
are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the government's
jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend
itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if
committed by its own citizens, officers or agents." Crimes that fall within

86

Id.

87

Id.

sId. at 97.
89 Id.
90 The court concluded that, becausejurisdiction ofcriminal offenses must be conferred upon
United States courts and could not be inferred, and because section 35, like all other sections of
chapter 4 (Comp. St. §§ 10191-10252), contains no reference to the high seas as a part of the
locus of the offense defined by it, as the sections in chapters II and 12 of the Criminal Code
(Comp. St §§ 10445-10483a) do, section 35 must be construed not to extend to acts committed
on the high seas. Id.
9 Id. at 97-98.
92Id. at 98. Bowman uses as examples for this class of crime, "assaults, murder, burglary,
larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement, and fraud of all kinds, which affect the peace and good
order of the community." Id.
9'The Court in Bowman stated, "[i]fpunishment of them is to be extended to include those
committed out side of the strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to say so in the
statute, and failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this regard." Id. at 98.
" Id. The Court in Bowman stated that "to limit their locus to the strictly territorial

jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a
large immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign
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this category are deemed acceptable to be considered for extraterritorial
application.
It is important to note from the above that the conduct ("nature of the
crime") involved was a consideration used by the Bowman court in determining the appropriate "locus." 5 It is also significant to see that extraterritoriality
is permitted in cases when the government is the victim of the crime." These
two factors will play a prominent role in the analysis used in Part V of this
Article.
Since 1922, the year the Bowman case was decided, many courts have
permitted extraterritoriality in cases involving criminal conduct. Cases since
Bowman have interpreted this decision broadly to allow for an extraterritorial
application in almost all cases in which prosecutors have decided to proceed
on the extraterritorial conduct.97 Even when the conduct is not directly
targeted against the United States government, extraterritoriality has been
permitted."
B. Business Crimes
The most noticeable business crimes area with cases extending jurisdiction
beyond the borders of the United States is in the area of antitrust." In United

countries as at home." Id.
Id. at 97-98.

The Court stated as the second category, "criminal statutes which are, as a class, not
logically dependent on their locality for the Government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because
of the right of the Government to defend itselfagainst obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated,
especially if committed by its own citizens, officers or agents." Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
" In United States v. Plummer, the Eleventh Circuit held that "courts in this Circuit and
elsewhere have routinely inferred congressional intent to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction
over foreign offenses that cause domestic harm." 221 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11 th Cir. 2000) (listing
numerous cases that permitted extraterritorial jurisdiction for alleged criminal acts).
98 See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1994) (using
Bowman as precedent for permitting extraterritoriality in a case under 18 U.S.C. § 1959
involving the commission of "violent crimes in aid of a racketeering enterprise"); Chua Han
Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Bowman and finding that
drug offenses could have an extraterritorial application).
"Prosecutions of business crimes have not been limited to the antitrust area. Insome cases,
the charges are against those outside the United States, while in other cases United States
businesses have been indicted for extraterritorial conduct. See China Government Corporation
Waives Sovereign Immunity, Pleads Guiltyto Export Violation,Fined$I Million, CORP. CIME
REP., May 21 2001, at I (describing how a government owned corporation of the People's
Republic of China pled non contendere "to a felony violation of the Export Administration
Act"); Bruce Zagaris, SEC and IBM Settle Argentine Bribery Case, 17 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.
REP. 86, 86 (2001) (discussing agreement between SEC and IBM in which IBM "agreed to pay
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States v Nippon,"° a foreign corporation was indicted under the Sherman Act
0
despite the fact "that the price-fixing activities took place entirely in Japan."'
Although the district court dismissed the case, appellate review reversed this
dismissal. Certiorari was not granted by the Supreme Court, so the decision
of the First Circuit, in this case of first impression, remains the final word in
the case.'0 2
In Nippon, the First Circuit found that since there was a Supreme Court
decision in the civil context, that allowed an extraterritorial application in
cases brought under the Sherman Act,0 3 the issue was settled. The Nippon
court found no basis to distinguish a civil extraterritorial holding under the
Sherman Act from one brought as a criminal charge." ° The court found that
"common sense suggests that courts should interpret the same language in the
same section of the same statute uniformly, regardless of whether the impetus
for interpretation is criminal or civil.' 0
In Nippon, the First Circuit Court ofAppeals rejected an array ofarguments
focused on why criminal cases should be treated differently than civil
actions."° In rejecting comity-based arguments the court stated, "[w]e live in
an age of international commerce, where decisions reached in one comer of the
world can reverberate around the globe in less time than it takes to tell the
tale."'0° Obviously concerned with the ramifications of a decision opposite of

$300,000 to settle charges related to allegations that its subsidiary in Argentina paid bribes to
secure a contract in the mid- 1990's").
" United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (Ist Cir. 1997).
10 Id. at 2.
"02
See generally Leigh Robin Lamendola, Note, The Continuing Transformation of
InternationalAntitrust Law and Policy: CriminalExtraterritorialApplication of the Sherman
Act in United States v. Nippon Paper Industries, 22 SuFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 663 (1999)
(discussing the extraterritorial application used in the Nippon case); Elliot Sulcove, The
ExtraterritorialReach ofthe CriminalProvisionsof US. Antitrust Laws: The Impact of United
States v. Nippon Paper Industries, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1067 (1998) (advocating a return
to a reasonableness approach in extraterritorial antitrust prosecutions).
303 See Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794-98 (1993). Prior to Hartfield,
courts had often used a "balancing" approach. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979) (listing ten considerations of whether to permit extraterritorial
jurisdiction).
'o Nippon, 109 F.3d at 4.
1o$
Id.
" For example, the court rejected an argument regarding the language in the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law that specifically references criminal conduct as separate from
civil conduct. Id. at 7. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the rule of lenity
should be used to resolve any ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Id. at 7-8.
"oId. at 8.
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that which was issued, the court remarked, "a ruling in NPI's favor would
create perverse incentives for those who would use nefarious means to
influence markets in the United States, rewarding them for erecting as many
territorial firewalls as possible between cause and effect."'" 8
The majority opinion does not focus on whether, in this context, "objective
territoriality" is an appropriate basis for jurisdiction. The opinion takes for
granted that extraterritorial conduct that substantially effects the United States
can be prosecuted in this country. In contrast, a concurring opinion reflects on
"whether this construction of Section One's criminal reach conforms with
principles of international law."'" Although permitting the extraterritorial
application, the concurring opinion found that the United States had "a strong
interest in protecting United States consumers, who were affected by the
increase in prices."" 10
Nippon has been followed by other investigations.. and indictments.
Companies outside the United States have been prosecuted by this country for
antitrust business crimes and United States companies have been prosecuted
for extraterritorial acts."' In some cases, the United States may be a victim of
108Id.
,o"Id. at 9.
110Id. at 12. Circuit Judge Lynch, in his concurrence, also stated that:
The only factor counseling against finding that the United States' antitrust
laws apply to this conduct is the fact that the situs of the conduct was Japan
and that the principles were Japanese corporations. This consideration is
inherent in the nature ofjurisdiction based on effects of conduct, where the
situs of the conduct is, by definition, always a foreign country. This does not
tip the balance against jurisdiction.
Id. at 12-13.
"' See Baker Hughes Says It Is Offering to Settle SEC Charges on Improper Overseas
Payments, CORP. CRIME REP., July 16, 2001, at 3 (describing offer to settle for SEC allegations
of improper payments in Indonesia, India and Brazil); JusticeDepartmentBegins Investigation
into PriceFixing by Five Paint CompaniesLaw, PaperReports, CORP. CRIME REP., June 11,
2001, at 5 (describing the investigation of companies, including some outside the United States,
in a "criminal probe into alleged price fixing in the automotive-refinishing industry").
112See Three InternationalCompanies to PleadGuilty in FoodFlavoringCartel, Will Pay
More than $9 Million in CriminalFines,CORP. CRIME REP., Sept. 3,2001, at 3 (describing two
Japanese corporations and one Korean corporation agreeing to plead guilty "for participating in
a worldwide conspiracy to fix the prices of, and allocate customers for nucleotides, a food flavor
enhancer"); Mitsubishi CorporationFined $134 Million for its Role in InternationalPriceFixing Cartel, CORP. CRIME REP., May 14, 2001, at 3 (describing the prosecutions of United
States and foreign companies for their role in international graphite electrodes price-fixing); In
First,JapaneseExec Agrees to FaceJailfor Violating US. Antitrust Law, CORP. CRIME REP.,
Feb. 26, 2001, at 5 ("U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese manufacturer of isostatic graphite" plead
guilty "for participating in an international cartel to fix the price of isostatic graphite."); Two
German Firms and Two US. Corporationsto Plead Guilty to Participatingin International
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the alleged illegality. 3 Other cases, however, are instances where the United
States is not a party to the alleged criminality and the conduct is being
prosecuted merely because it is found to have a substantial effect on the United
States.
V. "OBJECTIVE TERRITORIALITY"

"Objective territoriality" is the most common base for permitting extraterritorial jurisdiction. Although the roots of this doctrine are from a case
involving conduct between two states, I" courts have not hesitated to apply this
principle in international criminal cases. This is particularly true as society
becomes more globalized. Merely requiring that the conduct have an effect on
the country, even if it has to be a substantial effect, permits the prosecution of
a wide range of conduct.
The ramifications of continuing to use "objective territoriality" as a
jurisdictional base warrants reconsideration for several reasons. Globalization
changes the dynamic of what was once a realistic and restrained approach to
determining whether extraterritorial conduct would be subject to prosecution.
Using a test based upon whether the conduct has an effect on the United States
results in an expansive viewpoint, with few, if any, limits. It allows unrestrained prosecutorial discretion. It also alters the historical presumption
against extraterritorial applications in those instances when Congress fails to
specifically authorize an extraterritorial application.
This doctrine supports a position of increased crime-control, since using
"objective territoriality" can increase the ability to prosecute extraterritorial
conduct. Yet, if other countries proceed in a like manner against individuals
and businesses in the United States, the consequences can be serious. Opening
the door to more extraterritorial prosecutions may influence other countries to
proceed in a similar fashion. The most effective method for promoting ethical
business conduct may be lost when cultural considerations are not factored into
the determination of how best to control and punish criminal acts." 5

Vitamin Cartels, CORP. CRIME REP., May 15, 2000, at 4 (describing punishment given to two
German firms for antitrust violation in the vitamin industry).
' See German Company Pleads Guilty to Rigging Bids on USAID ConstructionContracts
in Egypt, CORP. CRIME REP., Aug. 28, 2000, at 3 (alleging that "[t]his German company
committed illegal activity in Alabama that had a serious impact on U.S. funded international
construction projects").
"4 See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
Is See generally William S. Laufer & Iwao Taka, Japan, Regulatory Compliance, and the
Wisdom ofExtraterritorialSocial Controls, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 487 (1995)
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A. Limitless ProsecutorialDiscretion
Premising jurisdiction on whether the conduct has an effect in the United
States provides few limits on what can be prosecuted here. After all, in a
global economy, what does not affect this country? As such, using an
"objective territorial" principle gives enormous discretion to prosecutors to
decide whether they wish to proceed with an extraterritorial prosecution." 16
These decisions of whether to charge a criminal offense are subject not only
to the whims of prosecutors, but also to the political desires of a particular
administration. As noted by Circuit Judge Lynch in his concurring opinion in
Nippon, "[c]hanging economic conditions, as well as different political
agendas, mean that antitrust policies may change from administration to
administration."' " Although Judge Lynch chose to permit the extraterritorial
application in this case, it is hard to envision circumstances that would restrict
an "objective territorial" philosophy."s
The United States takes a proactive approach to prosecuting extraterritorial
crimes when it permits an extraterritorial application merely because the
conduct has an effect in this country. Despite no specific language in the
statute authorizing extraterritoriality, and despite the fact that the conduct
might not be directly aimed at the government, as in Bowman, courts appear
reluctant to deprive prosecutors of their discretion to proceed against business
crimes occurring outside the United States." 9
Using an "objective territoriality" approach shifts the decision to prosecute
from a legislative decision to an executive one.'O For the most part, the

(discussing the need for extraterritorial control to use a methodology that "promote[s] corporate

and industrial self-regulation").
"

"Objective territoriality" has been the subject of criticism because of its breadth. See

Note, ExtraterritorialApplication
ofthe ExportAdministrationAct of1979 Underinternational

andAmerican Law, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1308, 1327 n. 118 (1983) (describing criticism that has
been lodged against using "objective territoriality"). But see Gary B. Born, A Reappraisalof the
ExtraterritorialReach of US. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 79-94 (1992) (arguing for

an "international law" presumption).
..United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1997).
1" One can analogize the effect doctrine used here, with that used in determining whether
conduct affects interstate commerce. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in United States v.

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), there were few restrictions on what would in fact have an effect on
interstate commerce.
"9 Many of the extraterritorial prosecutions are not for activity targeted against the United
States government. Rather, the jurisdiction is premised on merely causing "domestic harm." See
United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (listing instances of
extraterritorial prosecutions).
o In Blackner v. United States, the Supreme Court claimed that this was a power of
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decision whether to prosecute an extraterritorial business crime is left to
prosecutors. Some contend that prosecutors have not proceeded extraterritorially in a significant number of cases.'I Although internal Justice Department
guidelines provide some restraint on an individual prosecutor's actions, the
ultimate decision has left the hands of Congress for the arms of prosecutors.
Is it wise to leave these decisions to prosecutorial discretion? Prosecutors
have no ethical mandates specifically regarding these decisions. It is also
important to note that these decisions can have an enormous impact on
international relations. Prosecutors, however, are within the executive branch,
the nucleus for making decisions related to international relations. However,
a coordinated approach between the appropriate administrative agencies in
making decisions with political ramifications cannot be assured. Will
prosecutors consider the best way to handle improprieties in the business world
from a global perspective, or will these decisions only consider a national
approach? The uncertainty in how all prosecutors will answer this question
makes the enormous discretion being given to prosecutors a point of concern.
B. Realigningthe Presumptionof Territoriality
When Congress specifically addresses extraterritoriality within a statute,
the courts have no issue to resolve regarding extraterritoriality. Likewise,
prosecutors do not have the latitude to proceed outside the strict mandates of
the statute. The omission of specific extraterritorial language in a statute raises
issues that require court resolution. Historically, the view taken was that
absent specific language for extraterritoriality, the presumption was against
permitting an extraterritorial prosecution.'22 What was initially a presumption
against extraterritoriality in criminal cases, however, has in fact become a
reality of allowing extraterritoriality."
To assume a presumption in favor of extraterritoriality when Congress has
not spoken is against the historical weight that surrounds this question.124 Only
construction for the courts, as opposed to being a legislative power. 284 U.S. 421,437 (1932).
Yet, if the courts are interpreting instances when Congress has failed to speak, the very fact that
they could have spoken or might yet speak makes it somewhat invasive of the legislative

function.

121 See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight ofComity, 38 COLUM. J. TVRANSNAT'L L.
563,578 (2000) (stating that the "government uses extraterritoriality sparingly and uses comity

extensively, at least as a matter of prosecutorial discretion').
"" See United States v. Cotton, 471 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1973) (noting a "presumption
against extraterritorial application" unless there is evidence by Congress of "contrary intent").
'1 See, e.g., Plummer, 221 F.3d at 1305.
'24 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,437 (1932) (stating that "the legislation of

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 31:1

recently has globalization increased the ability to prosecute extraterritorial
crimes premised upon the conduct affecting this country. Obviously, one can
argue that if Congress is dissatisfied with this new line being drawn on the
continuum of what conduct outside the United States can be subject to
prosecution, it will speak more clearly in the statutory language. One can,
however, also argue the opposite here. If Congress wished for this conduct to
be prosecuted, then it would have spoken originally.
In essence, what has changed here is the presumption. By using "objective
territoriality" in a globalized world, the presumption of not permitting
extraterritorial conduct in criminal cases has become a presumption in favor
of permitting these prosecutions.
For those advocating increased crime control, this philosophical shift will
seem favorable. But acceptance is less likely if other countries take a similar
stance. Will the United States be ready to accept a foreign country proceeding
against a United States business for alleged crimes occurring in this country
that affect the foreign country? Would the United States accept this frameof the other country is legitimate conduct here
work hospitably if the crime
25
States?'
United
within the
C. OtherAvailable Remedies
Criminal actions are not the sole source for obtaining compliance with
recognized standards. Prosecutions against entities outside the United States
may be unnecessary in light of civil remedies available to businesses."
Businesses and individuals, both national and foreign, have the option of
proceeding civilly against wrongdoing that affects them. 27 The United States
government also has the option of proceeding with civil or administrative

the Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is construed to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States").
" See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1183 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (granting sumramry judgment motion in the United States when

civilian group from France sought to prohibit internet service provider from having items on the
web that were prohibited under French law).
'" In some cases the particular criminal statute may not be available for use in civil actions.
See Israel Aircraft Indus., Ltd. v. Sanwa Bus. Credit Corp., 16 F.3d 198, 200-02 (7th Cir. 1994)
(noting how the Export Administration Act does not provide a private right of action for victims
of foreign boycotts).
127 See Kent Greenfield, Ulta Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of CorporateIllegality
(With Notes on How CorporateLaw CouldReinforce InternationalLaw Norms), 87 VA. L. REV.
1279, 1371 (2001) (discussing foreigners suing American corporations in United States courts).
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actions in many instances.' Additionally, the imposition of trade restrictions
may ensure that improprieties occurring outside this country do not infiltrate
the United States.
In addition to national remedies, there are also international mechanisms
For example,
that can assist in promoting good business practices.
international organizations may offer assistance in curtailing improper conduct
129
occurring abroad.

The United States has been extremely successful in getting other countries
tojoin in fighting improprieties occurring within their countries. For example,
after the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the United States
pushed to have anti-bribery provisions adopted in other countries. 30 This
international cooperation approach can be fortified with additional rewards for
good business practices.
VI. "DEFENSIVE TERRITORIALITY"

Continuing with an "objective territoriality" approach in assessing whether
to prosecute extraterritorial business crimes raises substantial concern. What
was once a relatively restrictive way to view extraterritoriality has become a
limitless international principle. It is, therefore, necessary to reevaluate where
the line should be drawn in order to permit some of these prosecutions, but to
also place restrictions on unbridled prosecutorial discretion. The approach
taken here is that of "defensive territoriality."
A. The Components of "Defensive Territoriality"
Several factors need to be examined in determining whether an extraterritorial prosecution is proper. Clearly, the conduct needs to have an effect on the
United States, but in defining what type of an effect, the "defensive
territoriality" standard departs from the current analysis used by courts.
'23 See Bell South Settles FCPA Case with SEC, 16 CoRP. CRIME REP., Jan. 21, 2002, at I
(describing settlement between BellSouth and the SEC for alleged violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act).
'"' See European Commission Fines ADM, Five Other Companies in Sodium Gluconate
Cartel, CORP. CRIME REP., Oct. 8, 2001, at 4 (describing how the European Commission fined
both United States and foreign companies for "fixing the price and sharing the market for sodium
gluconate').
," See Bruce Zagaris, Effort to Implement OECD Anti-Corruption Convention Continues,
16 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 753, 753 (2000); Group Urges OECD Countries to Ban Bribe
Payments to Political Parties Abroad, CORP. CRIME REP., Oct. 30, 2000, at 5 (relating TI-s
urging member states to "prohibit bribe payments to foreign political parties").
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As previously stated, if Congress speaks directly to the issue of
extraterritoriality in the focus of the statute or in a specific provision, than
extraterritoriality is permitted without any qualifications. When Congress fails
to speak directly to the issue, as in many older statutes drafted when the issue
of extraterritoriality was not at the forefront of legislative minds, prosecutors
and courts should maintain the historical presumption against extraterritoriality. The policy consideration of non-interference with another country's
political and legal actions needs to be a prominent concern.
Several key ingredients subject an extraterritorial business crime to
prosecution in the United States. They include whether the prosecution is
necessary to protect this country, whether an administrative agency within the
United States controls the business entity, and whether the business entity
acted outside the United States for the deliberate purpose of avoiding
jurisdiction.
Protection of the United States government is imperative. This is implied
in using a protective principle to assess whether jurisdiction is appropriate in
an extraterritorial prosecution. "Defensive territoriality" differs from the
protective principle in that it is not limited to national security concerns,
focuses on protection of government interests as opposed to individual citizen
interests, and can include frauds perpetrated against the United States
government 3' and other conduct that might not necessarily fit the contours of
the protective principle. 3 ' Protection of the government should also be a
component in the determination process governing whether conduct that
effects the United States should be subject to prosecution.
The methodology one employs to ascertain whether the government in fact
needs protection includes identifying whether the government is the victim of
the crime, and whether the specific conduct involved affects the government.
In Bowman, the United States government was clearly the victim of the
criminal act, and the government was affected by the conduct involved.' 33

"' In the case of United States v.Birch, the protective principle was used even though
national security was not the focus of the offense. 470 F.2d 808 (4th Cir. 1972). The case
involved "extraterritorial forgery and false use of government documents," and the court stated
that "[t]he gravamen of the offenses is the assault on the integrity of the United States and its
official documents." Id. at 812. Using the analysis suggested in this Article, it would be
unnecessary to stretch the protective principle to fit these circumstances. "Defensive
territoriality" would clearly permit this prosecution since the conduct was against the United
States government.
"' See generally WISE & PODGOR, supra note 6, at 54-59 (discussing the protective
principle).
'3 See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94,95 (1922).
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Thus, the Court's finding that extraterritorial jurisdiction existed in that case
would be consistent with a standard of "defensive territoriality."
This landmark decision, however, has been followed by numerous decisions
that extend the holding far beyond its origins. Courts have permitted an
extraterritorial application without regard to the government being a victim and
without regard to the government being affected by the conduct's
criminality. " Restricting territoriality to "defensive territoriality," as opposed
to "objective territoriality" would still provide protection to the country, while
limiting aggressive prosecutions that can occur as the result of a limitless
approach offered by the existing "objective territoriality" doctrine.
B. Exceptions Warrantingan ExtraterritorialProsecution
Two caveats need to be recognized before discarding an "objective
territoriality" approach for that of "defensive territoriality." Deliberate
avoidance of jurisdiction should not be tolerated. Likewise, welcomed
jurisdiction by another country needs to be supported.
Conduct of United States businesses, deliberately occurring outside the
United States for the purpose of avoiding United States jurisdiction, should not
be tolerated. Such deliberate actions to circumvent the limits of criminal law
cannot be considered acceptable. The determination of deliberate avoidance
is a factual question, but evidence of a business proceeding with activity
outside this country, knowing that this activity would be subject to prosecution
here, would set the stage for a justified prosecution.
Equally compelling are those situations when another country welcomes the
United States into their jurisdiction for the purpose of proceeding with the
prosecution. Issues of comity are not concerns when another country seeks the
assistance of the United States. The strong prosecutorial abilities and the
resources available for prosecution may motivate another country to seek the
aid of the United States in curtailing improprieties occurring within their
country. International agreements and treaties that delineate the roles of each
country and permit prosecutions in another country do not impede the comity
concerns that accompany the United States proceeding against extraterritorial
conduct. 3 ' A policy of "defensive territoriality" should not restrain these

J' See supra note 60-62 and accompanying text.
23$ See

Waller, supra note 121, at 572-79.

See also Stephen J. Squeri, Government

Investigation and Enforcement: Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission, 1252
PLI/Corp 689, 831-4 (2001) (discussing antitrust cooperation agreements with foreign

countries).
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welcomed requests for assistance. Rather, this form of cooperative assistance
needs to be fostered.
VII. CONCLUSION

When courts use "objective territorially," the range of permissible conduct
that can be prosecuted is increased. Unlike terrorist acts, or those committing
acts of violence against the United States, legitimate businesses may find
themselves subject to United States prosecution merely because their conduct
had effects that crossed the borders into the country.
Increased globalization warrants that we reconfigure our approach to
extraterritorial prosecutions. The ramifications of continuing to use a
jurisdictional base that operates aggressively are frightening. Cognizance of
what can happen if another country should decide to reciprocate against the
United States for conduct they deem criminal or improper within their country
is imperative. "Defensive territoriality" offers a less aggressive posture to
resolving extraterritorial disputes. It advocates instituting deflectors so that
illegal conduct does not penetrate this country. More importantly, it maintains
the historical significance of the international base of jurisdiction known as
territoriality, while readjusting the "objective territorial" base to fit the
globalized world.

